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The present study analyses Portuguese municipalities’ data in order to understand 
how the incumbent tenure influences economic performance at a municipal level. The 
incumbents’ age is used as an instrumental variable to the mayors’ tenure and its effect 
on the local economic development and pre-electoral fiscal policy is measured through a 
Two-stage Least Squares estimation with random effects. Tenure proves to have an 
insignificant positive impact on all economic and fiscal variables analysed and specific 
time-effects preponderance is outlined. 
1. Introduction 
In this section the reader is provided with a context for the analysis carried out in this 
work. A brief framework of municipalities and local power history is presented. The 
centralization of power in the figure of the mayor is stressed out and a justification for the 
analysis of tenure impact on local economic development and municipal governance is 
introduced. 
1.1) Portuguese Local Power Brief History  
The municipality has been the most stable sub-division of Portugal over years. It has been 
instituted gradually from 10961 on, through the grant of organizational charts whenever 
the central power2 felt the need to establish a juridical recognized township and foster its 
population (Marques 1993). As Alexandre Herculano3 states, the medieval Portuguese 
                                                          
1 Date attributed to the organizational chart of Guimarães, according to the city’s archive: “Arquivo 
Municipal Alfredo Pimenta”. 
2 The deliberative power was centered in the King. Before the Zamora Treaty (1143), the first 
organizational charts - “cartas de foral”, in Portuguese – were granted by the Count D. Henrique, his 
wife D. Teresa and his son, D. Afonso Henriques himself, before managing to garn independence and 
establishing the Portuguese Kingdom (Marques 1993).  
3 A poet and writer associated to the Romantic period, Herculano was also the Portuguese pioneer of 
the study of the institution of Portuguese municipalities, with his “História de Portugal : desde o começo 
da monarchia até o fim do reinado de Affonso III”. 
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municipalities “represent, in a real and effective way, the variety against the unit, the 
irradiation of political life against centralization”, a process that met ebbs and flows over 
Portuguese history.  
Romero de Magalhães [1986] recognizes general great vitality and autonomy in the 
Ancient Portuguese Regime caused by the conjugation of different powers such as the 
King, the Church, and the juridical and municipal powers. However, there is no doubt 
that in the 14th and 15th centuries severe restrictions on municipal autonomy were 
imposed4, while autonomy was enhanced following the Portuguese Liberal Revolution of 
1820 (Ribeiro da Silva 1993) but only to be controlled shortly after, through an increased 
institutionalization between municipalities and the central state (Oliveira Rocha 1997). 
With the implementation of the First Republic, more autonomy was promised and 
foreseen, but it did not become a reality (Oliveira César 1996). 
Nevertheless, the fundamental point of relief for the analysis carried out in this work is 
the 25th of April Revolution, which was a turning point in the 20th century Portuguese 
municipal governance. During Estado Novo the governance model became highly 
centralized in the State with little resources being granted to local governance. 
Municipalities were regarded as corporative and used as propagandistic agents (Miranda 
2005), subordinated to the central power5.  
The first local elections after the Revolution were held in December 1976, and from then 
on “small is beautiful” became a motto increasingly applicable to the municipal 
governance in Portugal. A growth in political autonomy and in economic relevance of the 
                                                          
4 Marked in “Regimento dos corregedores”, a Law dating from 1332 that introduced external legal 
jurisdiction in municipalities 
5 In a speech delivered in the 30th of July of 1930, while announcing the creation of the National Union, 
the Portuguese dictator António Salazar uttered that he intended to “build a social and corporate state 
in close match with the natural constitution of society. Families, parishes, municipalities, corporations 
(…) are members of the nation”. 
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municipalities make the analysis of the impact of local governance quality on economic 
development and citizens’ welfare useful for the comprehension of the Portuguese 
political system. 
1.2) The Mayor’s Role 
Since 1985, ordinary elections are carried out every 4 years and both a Municipal 
Assembly and a Town Council are elected. The Town Council is chaired by the mayor 
and its competences cover almost all sectors of society - planning, rural and urban 
infrastructure, energy, transport and communications, education, health, housing, civil 
protection, heritage and culture, leisure and sports. In addition, there is a clear tendency 
to personalize the municipal political power in the mayor (Bilhim 2004), who many times 
informally plays a moderation role of different interests and powers such as the judicial 
power, the Church, the local business community, political parties and voters. 
In some of the fine Portuguese literature of the 19th and 20th century6, this informal socio-
economic relationship, imminently promiscuous, is brilliantly (and amusingly) portrayed. 
Oliveira Martins [1886] uses an expression, “cacique burocrata”, which efficiently 
describes the concentration of competences and powers in one state official using his 
prominent role to gain influence and personal advantages. This effect suffers a boost when 
we are talking about the mayor, the number one figure in the municipal hierarchy, with 
extended reach and power, translating into flagrant future electoral advantage.  
One can dare to state that a process of growing decentralization of political power, under 
the form of increased autonomy granted to municipalities – even though some defend it 
                                                          
6 Including works from such writers as Eça de Queirós, Camilo Castelo-Branco or Aquilino Ribeiro 
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is not nearly enough (Baleiras 2004) – has been translating into the centralization of 
powers within the municipal hierarchy, in the figure of the mayor. 
1.3) Term Limits and Tenure Economic Impact 
In 2005 the Portuguese parliament approved a law limiting the number of terms of an 
incumbent as president of a municipality7. This document states mayors can only be 
elected for up to three consecutive terms and therefore this term limitation became 
bidding in the 2013 local elections. The impact of this decision has been widely debated 
amongst political actors, but we are lacking a structured, diversified and pragmatic 
analysis of the economic impact of incumbent tenure on municipal economic 
performance.  
This may help to understand whether the term limits law was socially efficient or not. 
This topic is controversial, as some authors suggest that term limits have a distortionary 
effect on the political system, while others argue that limiting politicians to a number of 
consecutive terms helps to sanitize it.  
We handle this problem by analysing a variety of municipal economic performance 
indicators and detecting existing patterns that. The main challenge is to drill deeper and 
understand the economic impact of mayor’s tenure in Portuguese municipalities. 
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides a review on 
literature considered helpful to address the research question posed; section 3 presents the 
data used; section 4 describes the methodology and the econometric specification of the 
model; section 5 describes the empirical results and section 6 presents the conclusions. 
 
                                                          
7 Law nº. 46/2005 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1) Tenure impact analysis 
The effects of tenure in performance by politicians have not been deeply studied yet for 
a diverse set of countries, as the existing literature focuses mainly on the USA. Besides, 
the literature is not conclusive, since antagonistic results have been attained. 
The arguments to a positive impact of tenure and, thus, against the imposition of term 
limits, include the disciplinary power of accountability through elections (Ferraz and 
Finan 2011), prevention of competent politicians from being re-elected thus implying a 
negative impact of term limits on local economic development (Bonfiglioli and Gancia 
2013; Veiga and Veiga 2016) and a reputation-building hypothesis that states that term-
limited U.S. governors may shift their political behaviour resulting in lower state income 
(Besley and Case 1995). 
On the other hand, Smart and Sturm [2013], while recognizing the accountability power 
of elections, have argued that term limits may be beneficial as they induce truthful 
behaviour from incumbents, allowing for a better screening of incumbents’ preferences. 
Alt, Bueno de Mesquita, and Rose [2011] interestingly identify two separate effects on 
economic growth, taxes, spending and borrowing costs arising from term limits, which 
cancel each other out: the accountability effect (positive) and the competence effect 
(negative). 
The tenure effect has been studied in depth in other roles, for instance, in auditing. Carey 
and Simnett [2006] find evidence of deterioration of auditors’ performance associated 
with longer auditing partner tenure, using data from Australia. Chih-Ying, Chan-Jane, 
and Yu-Chen [2008] come to similar results using data from Taiwanese companies.  
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Even more striking evidence in favour of the hypothesis of correlation between tenure 
and deterioration in found by Coviello and Gagliarducci [2010], this time concerning 
mayor tenure. By matching data on procurement auctions in Italian municipalities and 
data on the politics of municipal governments, worse outcomes arising from longer mayor 
tenure are detected in the functioning of public procurement, such as fewer bidders per 
auction, a higher cost of procurement and a higher probability that the winner is local as 
well as that the same firm is awarded repeated auctions. 
There is, in fact, evidence in the literature sustaining the hypothesis that longer tenure 
may be correlated with devious behaviour allowing for grand-corruption (Rose-
Ackerman 1997). By staying more in years in office, mayors are more likely to control 
other branches of power and influence, such as the judicial system and the press. This 
hypothesis would imply a predominance of political power over administrative power, 
that ends up in a self-perpetuating cycle of power. Costas-Pérez, Solé-Ollé, and Sorribas-
Navarro [2012] stress out that even corruption scandals have little effect on election 
outcome if the case doesn’t get extensive press coverage (in which case the mayor loses 
an average of 14% of the votes). The ability to control locally institutions that are 
influential in the voters’ decision-making process may reinforce the probability of re-
election. In the same study from Costas-Pérez, Solé-Ollé, and Sorribas-Navarro (2012) 
no vote loss is detected in cases dismissed or with reports to the courts which did not lead 
to further judicial intervention. The fact that this study was conducted in Spain might 
favor extrapolation to the Portuguese population, due to cultural similarities.  
Control over institutions is correlated with higher mayors’ tenure and it self-perpetuates 
power. Accumulation of terms may work as a trigger for personal complicities that 
promote corruption or opportunistic behaviour. This is a negative trait of democracies 
where leaders stay in office for longer periods. However, it is legitimate to ask whether 
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the same effect that associates longer tenure in political roles to deteriorating or improving 
performance (varies across the literature) verifies when it comes to economic 
development indicators and local governance performance or if, on the other hand, the 
stability of keeping the same political leadership for several terms and a potentially 
existent learning curve for mayors sustains a positive effect of tenure on local economic 
development. 
 2.2) Tenure, Perceived Performance and Voter Myopia 
One question is how tenure influences municipal economic indicators. Another one is 
how tenure is perceived to influence those economic indicators by voters. We have 
previously used the auditors’ tenure literature to illustrate how tenure may be detrimental 
to incumbent’s performance. Now we will use it to illustrate how tenure may increase 
perceived performance quality. Ghosh and Moon [2005]  document a positive association 
between investor perceptions of earnings quality and auditor tenure. It may sound 
contradictory, but it is important to understand the difference between the perceived 
performance and actual performance. Is it possible that the same happens to mayors that 
accumulate terms and we are in face of a political myopia case?  
Even the single fact that the mayor running for re-election is a known face to voters may 
cause elections outcome not to be based neither on the quality of the project for the future 
of the municipality nor on tangible results achieved in previous terms, but on the visibility 
that the position in office grants the previous incumbent with (Lee 2001). Fowler [2014] 
goes even further by disentangling personal incumbency and partisan incumbency: the 
first proves to have a positive electoral effect and the latter is statistically insignificant. 
This effect is often pointed out as decisive in the literature either in the perspective of re-
election or in the face of the possibility of election of a relative to office (Dal et al. 2015). 
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Despite this, negative incumbency effects are also present in the literature, especially 
regarding developing countries (Titiunik 2009). Rahman [2013] documents a positive 
correlation between the existence of political dynasties and the occurrence of corruption. 
 2.3) Opportunistic Behaviour and Self-Interest based Distortions 
As we have seen, there is evidence that “political dinosaurs” often enjoy a positive bias 
in voters’ perception. It is, therefore, interesting to our analysis to understand if the 
accumulation of mandates is related to opportunistic behaviour by mayors, which 
amplifies that bias in the performance perceived by voters.  
Barro [1973] points out a division between voter and political representatives interests. 
He also defends the existence of mechanisms that align those different interests, being 
one of those the election, which makes the political representative accountable for his acts 
and creates a positive incentive for the incumbent looking forward to being re-elected. 
With term limits that incentive may be removed. Elections also have the advantage of 
creating an adverse-selection mechanism, punishing politicians that did not perform 
according to citizens’ best interest (Ferejohn 1986).  
Despite this, the fact is that there is evidence that, in the presence of asymmetric 
information between voters and politicians, there may be an incentive to adopt 
opportunistic measures that increase voters’ perceived incumbent performance. This 
would translate into a Political Business Cycle (Rogoff 1990). The incentive to raise 
investment in the year preceding elections described in the Rogoff PBC’s model made 
Candel-Sánchez [2007] propose a sanctions-based budget discipline fiscal model.  
However, Shi and Svensson [2006], stress that the efficiency of pre-electoral 
opportunistic behaviour and the existence of PBC’s differ across countries depending on 
such factors as rents to be attained by politicians if they stay in office and the share of 
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informed voters in the electorate. Guo [2009] uses a panel data set to understand how 
opportunistic behaviour under the form of pre-electoral spending varies according to a 
political leader’s time in office, finding evidence of increased spending in the leaders’ 3rd 
and 4th year in office, a timing regarded as strategic to attain promotions and 
acknowledgement among superiors. 
2.4) Portuguese Municipalities 
There is literature on the above-mentioned topics using Portuguese municipalities data. 
Veiga and Veiga [2016] provide evidence of a negative impact of term limits, which force 
competent mayors out of office. However, there is evidence of a positive impact through 
the decreasing of opportunistic manipulation of local finances by lame ducks, while no 
evidence of costs from the elections accountability effect is found. 
The decreasing opportunistic behaviour arising from term limits is corroborated by a 
previous, but still very recent, study from Lopes  da Fonseca [2015], in which evidence 
that lame ducks decrease taxes, user charges and spending is found. 
The current study differs from the existing literature on term limits, electoral behaviour 
and lame ducks using Portuguese municipalities’ data, mainly because of the focus and 
on the data set before the term limits law became binding, carrying out an extensive 
analysis on non-limited mayors in order to grasp the effect of extended tenure on local 
economic performance. Mayor’s age is adopted as an instrument for the number of terms, 
which allows to control endogeneity. The dependent variables chosen to portray local 
economic development and fiscal opportunistic behaviour may allow to provide 
evidences supporting some of the diverse (and sometimes colliding) notions present in 




3. Sample Size and Data Issues 
Portugal is sub-divided in districts, municipalities and parishes. The latter are small and 
relatively short of resources, which are many times controlled by municipalities. Portugal 
has 308 municipalities, distributed over 12 districts. We use a panel data set of 278 
municipalities8 due to unavailability of key indicators in 30 of them. 
Portuguese municipalities provide us with a high-quality dataset to carry out statistical 
inference about the effects of tenure on municipal economic performance because: i) 
Portugal was one of the last countries approving a term limitation law, thus even though 
our democracy is relatively young we have a comprehensive data set, in this case 
including data on five local elections: 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005 and 2009; ii) The fact that 
the law approved in 2005 already became bidding allows us to investigate the difference 
in behaviour during the year of 2012 between lame ducks (incumbents unable to run again 
for office in 2013) and mayors with possibility of reelection (not done in this work); iii) 
Before the term limits law became binding in 2013, there was a clear tendency for mayors 
to accumulate consecutive terms, which provides us with a fine number of cases 
representative of the advantages or disadvantages of incumbents tenure, which is the 
focus of the current work. Before the 2013 elections, even though the most frequent case 
was that of mayor holding a single term the average number of terms amounted up to 
approximately 3, indicating there were many incumbents accumulating several terms.  
Per capita purchasing power will serve as one our dependent variable for assessing the 
effect of incumbents’ tenure on municipal economic performance and was obtained from 
the Portuguese National Institute of Statistics (INE). The per capita Purchasing Power is 
used as a proxy for local economic development and citizens’ welfare at a municipal 
                                                          
8 See appendix 8.1 for a complete listo f the municipalities considered for this study. 
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level. This is a synthetic indicator calculated according to a reference national value of 
100 for Portugal and reflects daily purchasing power revealed by local populations. 
Caution is needed while making statistical inference using such a synthetic indicator to 
portray economic development. It must not be appropriated as a variable with a well-
delimited conceptual framework, such as wages or consumption, however. 
The investment and the IMI share, as well as the investment per capita, IMI per capita 
and budgetary surplus (or deficit, depending on the sign) are indicators illustrating the 
mayors’ behaviour in the year preceding elections and were obtained from the annual 
publication on municipal finance of “Direcção-geral das Autarquias Locais”. These 
indicators are obtained through a simple ratio: 









The “IMI” (a municipal housing tax) is determined, even though if only to some 
extension, by mayors’ fiscal choices (see information in the appendix, for a closer look), 
thus being a valid measure of fiscal policy. Investment share enables the comprehension 
of how much of the total spending was spent in investment. Both the investment and IMI 
share and also the Budgetary Performance (budget surplus or deficit, measured in 
“contos”9), while associated to an election year, are referent to the year preceding the 
election. Since elections take place traditionally in October – from 1985 on, which covers 
the period of our analysis – reforms and political shifts occurring in the last 3 months of 
the civil year could contaminate our goal of detecting opportunistic behaviour. As it is, 
                                                          
9 Portuguese currency before the adoption of the Euro 
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the year preceding the election is more likely to describe accurately whether the 
incumbent approach is opportunistic or not. 
Data on political variables such as the mayor’s age, education, the number of terms and 
the mayor’s ideological orientation was collected from the National Elections Comission 
(CNE). 
4. Methodology and Econometrics Model 
A longitudinal panel framework was designed to describe the relationship between 
political variables associated to the incumbent (including tenure) and local economic 
development and fiscal variables, allowing for dynamic relationships and to control for 
individual heterogeneity, offering more variability, more degrees of freedom and 
reducing collinearity among explanatory variables. As it is, the efficiency of the 
econometric estimates is improved. 
We use panel data models covering 278 municipalities and five moments in our 
democracy’s history: the local election periods from 1992 to 2009, thus the 1993, 1997, 
2001, 2005 and 2009 elections. 
This was a period in which politicians could accumulate terms in office in an unlimited 
way, which led to the an average number of mandates of 3 by 2009 and the accumulation 
of such number of terms as 10 in two municipalities, by 2013: Braga and Vila Nova de 
Poiares. In the 2013 election this extended tenure as mayor became no longer possible 
after the 2005 3 terms limit law became binding.  
As it is, it becomes important to analyse this period in order to understand the effect of 
the incumbent’s number of terms on the local economic performance.  
4.1) 2-Stage-Least-Square Estimation 
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The Per Capita Purchasing Power, for instance, is one of the most tangible economic 
indicators picked, so the risk of endogeneity is most likely high, in the form of reverse 
causality. That is, if it is legitimate to assess the effects of the number of terms on local 
economic development, using the Per Capita Purchasing Power as a proxy, it is certainly 
plausible that there is a causal relation between the number of elections won by the mayor 
(that translates into number of terms) and the economic development perceived by local 
citizens under the form of Per Capita Purchasing Power. 
The method picked up to tackle this reverse causality problem was the use of instrumental 
variables. The incumbent’s age was used as an instrument. In IV estimation, amongst 
other conditions, the instrument should be independent from the error term of the 
regression. Also, the instrument should not affect the dependent variable when the 
instrumented explanatory variable is held constant (exclusion restriction). Since, 
intuitively and empirically10, the exclusion restriction is respected regarding the 
relationship between age and the dependent variables analysed. Weak instrument testing 
is run later on this work. As it is we follow a 2-Stage-Least-Squares regression: 
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚′𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
∝𝑖𝑡=  𝛼 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚′𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
“Age” accounts for the age of the mayor in the moment of election, 𝛼 is a constant, 
“Term” is the number of terms accumulated at the date of election, “ Term’ ” is the 
explanatory variable regressed on the instrument. 𝛽1 is the coefficient representing the 
average effect of “Age” on “Term ‘ “, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of control variables, 𝛽2 represent the 
effect of this vector on Age of the mayor and, more importantly, 𝛽4 represents the effect 
of this vector on ∝𝑖𝑡, (Per Capita Purchasing Power and various fiscal variables). 𝛽3 
                                                          
10 see Apeendix 8.3 
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represents the effect of our instrument, mayor’s age on the ∝𝑖𝑡 and   𝜀𝑖𝑡 is an error term, 
for each municipality (i) and moment in time (t). 
The vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡 includes:  
i) variables associated to the mayor’s personality: a dummy 
controlling for an ideological effect on per capita purchasing power 
in the case of the mayor belonging to leftist parties (Left) and a 
dummy controlling for possible positive effects in the municipal 
development  arising from potential increased competence if the 
mayor has completed High Education (High_Education) 
ii) one control variable associated to population characteristics: the 
dependency ratio (Dependency), which describes the percentage of 
citizens economically and socially dependent from other citizens 
(i.e. elderly or children). 
4.2) Specific Time Effects and Random Effects 
In order to apply the correct framework and have consistent estimates and valid inference 
a panel unit root tests should be carried out considering the unbalanced panel data set we 
have. The rejection of the null hypothesis means that at least one of the series i is 
stationary. Thus, it is possible that only one municipality is stationary and, still, the null 
hypothesis of all series being non-stationary is rejected. Non-stationarity can cause 
spurious estimates while estimating a panel model without a lagged dependent variable. 
As will be explained in the estimation results, we included specific time dummies in our 
regression, for each election year, resulting in the following Second-stage 2SLS 
regression equation and random effects term: 
∝𝑖𝑡=  𝛼 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚′𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑡 + ∅ 𝑡𝑗 + 𝑣𝑖  +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
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∝𝑖𝑡 is a vector of economic performance variables. t represents the specific year effect on 
∝𝑖𝑡, for j=1,…,5 (corresponding to each of the five elections’ year analyzed), being ∅ its 
coefficient. 𝑣𝑖 is between-entity errors effect. The within-entity error is represented by 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
This difference in the composition of the error term denotes that a random effects analysis 
was carried out to the detriment of the fixed effects approach (used in Alt, Bueno de 
Mesquita, and Rose 2011), according to the Hausman test rule (deeper detail in the 
estimation results). This allows for consistency of the estimation, assuming that the error 
term is uncorrelated with the estimators. Another advantage of random effects is that we 
are allowed to include time invariant variables (such as our control for High Education) 
without having its effect captured by the intercept. 
 4.3) Same Model, Different Controls 
The same model is used to study potential opportunistic behavior from mayors looking 
for reelection. Based on the strong evidence of opportunistic manipulation of local 
finances in Portugal (Aid, Veiga and Veiga 2011; Veiga and Veiga, 2007), we check if 
the occurrence of opportunistic behavior in pre-electoral years varies according to 
mayors’ tenure. 
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚′𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
∝𝑖𝑡=  𝛼 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚′𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑡 + ∅ 𝑡𝑗 + 𝑣𝑖  +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
In order to grasp the electoral-cycle characteristic increment in ∝𝑖𝑡  (investment, IMI or 
deteriorating budgetary performance preceding elections), we control for different 
variables. Thus, the vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡 accounts for: 
i) political control variables: Left, a dummy that assumes the value of 
1 is the mayor is ideologically close to the left of the partidary 
17 
 
specter; Reelected or Same Party, a dummy that assumes the value 
of 1 if the incumbent is running for reelection or is supporting a 
fellow candidate from the same party. 
ii) socioeconomic control variables: Resident, that describes the 
number of residents in the municipality. 
 ∝𝑖𝑡 is kept from the previous specification, as well as the random errors term. The vector  
∅ 𝑡𝑗 is also kept in an effort to capture potential year specific fluctuations.  
Having our model defined we have to deal with heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation. 
The fact that we are running a random effects model already allows to account for non-
independent residuals. Besides, we correct standard errors with cluster by municipality, 
by bootstrapping the standard errors in order to avoid cross-sectional interdependence. 
This way observations in each municipality are truly independent. Since we only have 5 
time periods in a longitudinal panel data set, already having time specific dummies in our 
analysis, standard errors are not clustered by year. 
5. Estimation Results 
5.1) Descriptive Analysis: Reduced Forms and Age at Retirement 
Mayors’ retirement age density function is relatively well-behaved. This Kernel Density 
function indicates roughly 50 years as 
the average retirement age.  
Taking a look at the reduced forms of 
some of the relationships we are 
assessing, we start by analysing how 
accumulation of mandates affects a 




purchasing power, the budgetary municipal speravit/deficit, the investment share, the IMI 
share, the investment per capita and the IMI per capita. This allows for a quick 
identifications of patterns and trends. 
Figure 2 and 3: Per Capita Purchase Power and Budgetary Performance 
 
The per capita Purchasing Power increases with the number of mandates (Figure 1). The 
budgetary performance, measured per capita in the old Portuguese currency, “contos” 
fluctuates around 0 until the 6th mandate. From then on, the reduced number of 
observations make the results highly volatile and exposed to specific municipalities’ 
effects.  Interestingly enough, there is a common deterioration, both in the Purchasing 
Power and in the budgetary deficit from the 3rd to the 4th mandate. We cannot infer 
through the observation of this binned scatter lots whether this variation is due to an 
exogenous event or an effect caused by mandate accumulation. 
In fact this is a very raw analysis, which does not enable causal inference, because of 
issues with the data that will be addressed later on.  
The investment per capita and IMI per capita have similar functional shapes describing 
the relation of this indicators and mandate accumulation. The discontinuity follow the 
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2nd mandate could indicate that this is a point perceived as crucial by mayors that are 
looking forward to being re-elected.11 
Figure 4 and 5: Per capita Investment, IMI and accumulation of terms 
 
However, it is difficult to tell for sure. While analysing the relationship between mandates 
and our dependent variables, two concerns must be kept in mind: endogeneity arising 
from potential reverse causality and unobserved heterogeneity, as we exclude time-
specific and trend effects linearly correlated to the number of mandates as an explanatory 
variable.  
Since the number of mandates of mayors is linearly correlated to the time variable, it is 
plausible to affirm that our variables are non-stationary and have a trend, so we proceed 
to a stationarity test. 
1.2) Fisher-type Unit Roots, Hausman and Weak Instrument Tests 
Table 3 provides the panel unit root rest results of the variables in study at level. The 
Fisher-type panel unit-root test, based on Phillips-Perron is valid for unbalanced data and 
                                                          
11 See 8.4 in the Appendix for an analysis of the investment share and the IMI share. The investment 
share suffers a clear downfall after the 6th mandate. The negative 3rd mandate effect also denotes 
itself, even if in a shy fashion. On the opposite, the IMI weight on municipal revenues increases 
throughout mandates, as it became a increasingly important source of revenue for municipalities. 
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tests the null hypothesis that all panels contain a unit root. For a finite number of panels, 






Purchasing Power (per capita) -6.27*** -17.6527 *** 
Investment share 0.7769 -11.8209*** 
IMI share 4.0556 -8.8749*** 
Investment (per capita) 18.2238 2.6690 
Budget Results -18.7482*** -26.4977*** 
Mandates -5.6245*** 2.9362 
Resident -6.4225*** -7.9416*** 
Dependency Ratio 7.2286 -19.6840*** 
Table 3 - Fisher-type panel unit-root test.  *** ,  ** and * indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10%,  
respectively. The Null Hypothesis is such that all panels contain unit roots, against some panels being stationary. 
 
This test provides evidence of provide evidences of potential first order integration of 
some variables (since they are non-integrated of order 0) such as the investment share and 
per capita, the IMI12 share or even the dependency ratio. On the other hand, per capita 
purchasing power, the number of residents per municipality and the budgetary surplus 
appear to have integration of order zero. Since inference is not valid if variables have 
different orders of integration, it is unlikely that we can extract accurate conclusions for 
a model with the variables at level form, thus a first-differencing procedure could be 
carried out. However, this would translate into distorted conclusions, which do not match 
neither our research question nor the characteristics of our variables, thus we do not 
perform the Fisher-type panel unit-root test, based on Phillips-Perron, for first-difference 
analysis. 
To overcome this issue, we include time-specific dummies in our model. It is useful to 
bear in mind that, since we are evaluating the impact of one additional term in economic 
                                                          
12Portuguese Municipal Tax on Real Estate (see Appendix 2 for detailed information) 
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variables but also on pre-electoral fiscal variables, five year dummies are enough to cover 
the electoral periods covered from 1993 to 2009. These dummies capture year-specific 
effects that are of interest to our analysis of the evolution of political business cycles 
which are proved to exist in the case of Portuguese municipalities (Veiga and Veiga 
2007). Since the analysis comprehends gaps in-between electoral years and the analysis 
is restricted to 5 periods we expect the year-dummies to comprise the time-varying 
effects. Nevertheless, since the data is not first-differenced, one should be cautious with 
the inference made. 
Given the longitudinal characteristics of the data, one should choose the best model 
considering the properties of the data and the results of criteria tests, in this case the 
Hausman test, allowing for a distinction between fixed effects and random effects.  
Hausman Prob>chi2 







0.3927 0.0609 0.8276 0.9242 1.0000 0.9997 
Table 4 – Hausman Test. *** ,  ** and * indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10%,  respectively. The Null 
Hypothesis is such that difference in coefficients is not systematic. 
The Hausman test fails to reject the null that the difference in coefficients is not 
systematic, therefore, favoring random effects over fixed effects.  
Random effects assume that the entity’s error term is not correlated with the predictors 
which allows for time-invariant variables to play a role as explanatory variables. In 
random-effects one needs to specify those individual characteristics that may or may not 
influence the predictor variables. The problem with this is that some variables may not be 
available therefore leading to omitted variable bias in the model, which is a limitation of 




Nevertheless, we focus on the rationale of the relation of tenure with economic variables, 
not holding that the model presented has a perfect goodness of fit and complete 
specification. Random Effects analysis allows to generalize the inferences beyond the 
sample used in the model. 




Invest. Share Invest. p/capita IMIShare Budget Superavit 
0.3927* 0.546 0.011** 0.001*** 0.057* 0.001*** 
Table 5: Weak Instrument Analysis. *** ,  ** and * indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10%,  
respectively. The Null Hypothesis is such that mayors’ Age is a weak instrument, not holding a significant correlation 
with the number of terms. 
 
Since we carry out an instrument variable analysis, an analysis of the quality of Age as 
instrument is fundamental. As table 5 shows, we reject the null hypothesis in the case of 
every dependent variable analyzed with the exception of unemployment (for which 
inference becomes invalid through 2SLS)13. As it is, we move on to a 2SLS estimation 
with random effects. 
1.3) Effect of tenure in local development: are dinosaurs beneficial for 
the local economy and do they get opportunistic over time? 
Table 6 presents the estimations of our 2SLS model with random effects. 
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚′𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
∝𝑖𝑡=  𝛼 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚′𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑡 + ∅ 𝑡𝑗 + 𝑣𝑖  +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
The effect of an additional term becomes largely insignificant regarding all the fiscal 
variables analysed and also our proxy for local economic development, the per capita 
purchasing power: the average effect of one additional term over the per capita purchasing 
                                                          
13 See figure 8 in the Appendix 8.4 for a graphical intuitive evaluation of Age as an instrument for the 
number of terms. 
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power, with the number of terms changing across time and between municipalities is of 
3.487, which is non-significant regarding the bootstrapped standard-error of 7,424. 
According to this estimation, tenure holds no effect on opportunistic behaviour, as it can 
be confirmed through the non-significance of all variables with the increment in one term 
in o office by mayors. 
High education remains insignificant, suggesting that the level of education of the leader 
of local government does not show a clear effect on local economic performance. This 












































































































































1260 1267 1266 1266 1267 
R2 0.1949 0.3317 0.497 0.1324 0.0259 
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Table 6 – Tenure Impact Analysis: *** ,  ** and * indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10%,  
respectively. The Null Hypothesis is such that the coefficients equal 0. Bootstrapped robust standard errors under 
brackets. 
accumulated various terms. The relatively low renovation of political leaders in our 
municipal system could be correlated with this results, if, for instance, younger talented 
individuals do not get the opportunity to reach a top role in the political hierarchy, such 
as the mayor. Also, there is no clear evidence in the literature of increasing political 
governance performance arising from the level of education. 
The dependency ratio has a small but, but yet statistically significant, expected negative 
coefficient on investment and a positive one on municipal taxes. Citizens dependent from 
other citizens (mainly elderly, those suffering from impairing health condition and 
children) cannot contribute to the local economy, so an increment the dependency rates 
cause the aggregate per capita purchasing power to decrease, and thus the per capita 
purchasing power. 
Politicians associated to left parties do not seem to have any specific tendency to 
increased opportunistic behaviour: the pre-electoral investment share is even significantly 
lower for this group of mayors by almost 3%. 
The specific-time effects are responsible for a great deal of the explanatory power of our 
model, favouring the hypothesis of tenure not having a statistically significant impact on 
local economic development and fiscal policy choices in pre-electoral years. 
6. Conclusions, Limitations and Further Research 
This work intended to assess if mayors’ tenure influenced local economic development 
and pre-electoral fiscal policy choices. Increasing opportunistic behaviour in the face of 
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the accumulation of mandates could indicate a self-perpetuating behaviour-detrimental 
cycle.  
The results attained go against the literature that suggests an adverse effect from term 
limits, since there is no evidence of increased performance arising from prolonged tenure. 
We were also interested in understanding if there was increased opportunistic behaviour 
with the accumulations of several terms in office, which could contribute itself to increase 
re-election probability. Our estimation does not confirm this assumption.  
Specific year dummies end up absorbing much of our model explanatory power. This 
provides fertile ground for future research of a potential illusion effect of time effects on 
voters. It could be that voters perceive variations on economic indicators and even fiscal 
variables as related to mayors’ preferences when they are, in fact, due to exogenous 
shocks and time-varying factors. 
The statistical inference carried out has limitations. IV performance in small samples may 
be poor, which raises concerns about the validity of the analysis. Furthermore, robustness 
checks could have been beneficial. A Newey–West estimator could potentially be used to 
try to overcome heteroscedasticity in the error terms (since serial correlation should not 
be much of an issue in a short longitudinal data set as ours). Testing for cross-sectional 
dependence and contemporaneous correlation could also be an elucidatory approach. 
More variables should be included in this specification in order to tackle a potential 
omitted variable bias problem. Other identification schemes could provide a better 
understanding of this research question, such as the Hausman–Taylor estimator for error-
components models. IV-GMM estimation or regression-discontinuity and difference-in-
difference analysis using the 2013 elections, which were already bidding regarding the 
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8. Non-essential Appendixes 
8.1) Table 1 - List of considered Portuguese Municipalities 
Abrantes Benavente  Ferreira do Zêzere  Mirandela Peniche Sobral de Monte 
Águeda Bombarral Figueira da Foz Mogadouro Peso da Régua Agraço 
Aguiar da Beira Borba Figueira de Castelo 
Rodrigo 
Moimenta da Beira Pinhel Soure 
Alandroal Boticas Figueiró dos Vinhos Moita Pombal Sousel 
Albergaria-a-Velha Braga Fornos de Algodres Monção Ponte da Barca Tábua 
Albufeira Bragança Freixo de Espada à 
Cinta 
Monchique Ponte de Lima Tabuaço 
Alcácer do Sal Cabeceiras de Basto Fronteira Mondim de Basto Ponte de Sor Tarouca 
Alcanena Cadaval Fundão Monforte Portalegre Tavira 
Alcobaça  Caldas da Rainha  Gavião Montalegre Portel Terras de Bouro 
Alcochete Caminha Góis Montemor-o-Novo Portimão Tomar 
Alcoutim Campo Maior Golegã Montemor-o-Velho Porto Tondela 
Alenquer Cantanhede Gondomar Montijo Porto de Mós Torre de Moncorvo 
Alfândega da Fé Carrazeda de 
Ansiães 
Gouveia Mora Póvoa de Lanhoso Torres Novas 
Alijó Carregal do Sal Grândola Mortágua Póvoa de Varzim Torres Vedras 
Aljezur  Cartaxo Guarda  Moura Proença-a-Nova Trancoso 
Aljustrel Cascais Guimarães Mourão Redondo Trofa 
Almada Castanheira de Pêra Idanha-a-Nova  Murça Reguengos de 
Monsaraz 
Vagos 
Almeida Castelo Branco Ílhavo Murtela Resende Vale de Cambra 
Almeirim Castelo de Paiva Lagoa Nazaré Ribeira de Pena Valença 
Almodôvar Castelo de Vide Lagos Nelas Rio Maior Valongo  
Alpiarça Castro de Aire Lamego Nisa Sabrosa Valpaços 
Alter do Chão Castro Marim Leiria Óbidos Sabugal Vendas Novas 
Alvaiázere Castro Verde Lisboa Odemira Salvaterra de Magos Viana do Alentejo 
Alvito  Celorico da Beira Loulé Odivelas Santa Comba Dão Viana do Castelo 
 Amadora Celorico de Basto Loures Oeiras Santa Maria da Feira Vidigueira 
Amarante Chamusca Lourinhã Oleiros Santa Marta de 
Penaguião 
Vieira do Minho 
Amares Chaves  Lousã Olhão Santarém Vila de Rei 
Anadia Cinfães Lousada Oliveira de Azeméis Santiago do Cacém Vila do Bispo 
Ansião  Coimbra Mação Oliveira de Frades Santo Tirso Vila do Conde 
Arcos de Valdevez Condeixa-a-Nova Macedo de 
Cavaleiros 
Oliveira do Bairro São Brás de Alportel Vila Flor 
Arganil Constância Mafra Oliveira do Hospital São João da Madeira Vila Franca de Xira 
Armamar  Coruche Maia Ourém  São João da 
Pesqueira 
Vila Nova da 
Barquinha 
Arouca Covilhã Mangualde Ourique São Pedro do Sul Vila Nova de 
Cerveira 
Arraiolos  Crato Manteigas Ovar Sardoal Vila Nova de 
Famalicão 
Arronches Cuba Marco de Canavezes Paços de Ferreira Sátão Vila Nova de Foz 
Cõs 
Arruda dos Vinhos Elvas Marinha Grande Palmela Seia Vila Nova de Gaia 
Aveiro Entroncamento Marvão  Pampilhosa da Serra Seixal Vila Nova de Póvoa 
Avis Espinho Matosinhos Parede Sernancelhe Vila Nova de Poiares 
Azambuja Esposende Mealhada  Paredes de Coura Serpa Vila Pouca de 
Aguiar 
Baião Estarreja Meda Pedrógão Grande Sertã Vila Real 
Barcelos Estremoz Melgaço Penacova Sesimbra Vila Real de Santo 
António 
Barrancos Évora Mértola Penafiel Setúbal Vila Velha de Rodão 
Barreiro Fafe Mesão Frio Penalva do Castelo Sever do Vouga Vila Verde 
Vila Viçosa 
Batalha  Faro  Mira Penamacor Silves Vimioso 
Beja Felgueiras Miranda do Corvo Penedono Sines Vinhais 




8.2) “IMI” Calculation 
In order to calculate IMI, we need to know the value of the asset to then multiply by the 
applicable tax of the respective municipality.  
 
The value of the tax paid of an urban asset is calculated by the following equation: 
TAV = GV x A x Ac x Lc x Qc x Oc 
Where, 
• “TAV” stands for the Taxed Asset Value. 
• “GV” stands for the Ground Value of the asset. 
• “A” stands for the Area of the asset. 
• “Ac” stands for Affectation coefficient. 
• “Lc” stands for Localization coefficient. 
• “Qc” stands for Quality and comfort coefficient. 
• “Oc” stands for Obsolescence coefficient. 
VT is then rounded to the immediate superior ten of euros. 
The municipality rate (IMI) is then applied on the Taxed Asset Value. It can go from 














8.3) Table 2 - Correlation Instrument and Dependent Variables – For IV Exclusion 
































































































































































8.4) Figure 8 – Positive strong correlation between the number of terms and mayors’ age 
 
 
 
